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ABSTRACT 
 
Information security seriously concerns Corporate America but the soaring cost on protecting 
information assets raises equal concerns. These concerns appear to be more threatening to the 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as the percentage of their IT budgets spent on information 
security protection sharply surpasses those percentages budgeted by large enterprises. In light of 
these concerns, we propose an integrated and attainable framework that could heuristically 
promote strategic decision thinking on protecting information assets for the SMEs.  In comparison 
to other approaches that aim at reaching an optimal decision through complex mathematical 
models, our framework requires no such computations. The goal of our approach is to help a SME 
reach such decisions with a framework that takes business, technological and managerial issues 
into account. The proposed framework fosters strategic thinking of security issues with simple and 
practical steps to achieve a balanced, consistent, and efficient protection with total involvement 
from all stakeholders of the information assets that need to be protected. 
 
 
CHALLENGES TO PROTECTING INFORMATION ASSETS 
 
ecurity is going main stream; it is fundamental to e-business and it is not an afterthought strategy 
anymore. It is tightly integrated into e-business infrastructure and becomes increasingly less of separate 
function within IT. Security is also going to Main Street. Every small and medium business will have 
some sort of e-business functions. With rapid increased outsourcing of solutions and services, security is 
even more critical and requires simplification and integration to the entire business operation. On the other hand, the 
soaring cost on protecting enterprise information assets equally concerns Corporate America. As a survey conducted 
by Information Security Magazine (ISM) as shown in Figure 1, these challenges appear to be more threatening to the 
competitiveness of small firms: the percentage of their IT budget devoted to security protection sharply surpasses the 
corresponding percentage budgeted by large enterprises. Due to a much smaller IT unit, a small or medium enterprise 
(SME) often does not possess strong expertise and resource to support its information security. As a result, it is likely 
for the SME to handle security protection in an ad-hoc manner. The protection is often at the price of sacrificing the 
total utility of its information assets. Such a practice is definitely detrimental to its competitiveness due to the 
following reasons: 
 
 Ad hoc security measures don’t maximize the protection on information assets. 
 Ad hoc security protection oftentimes hinders the strategic uses of information assets.  
 Investments on ad hoc security protection perish more quickly, attributable to inconsistent policy and 
technology being endorsed. 
S 
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Figure 1. Spending by company size (Source: 2002 ISM 
Annual Survey of 215 information security practitioners).
 
 
 
 Security is always a delicate combination of practice, policy, technology and know-how. The ultimate goal 
of security control is to protect the information assets of a company. To understand why a SME is easily overwhelmed 
by the complexity of securing and protecting its information assets, we summarize the most common security 
concerns and their corresponding technological solutions in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1:  Security Concerns And Protection Tools/Solutions 
 
Security Concerns Tools/Solutions 
Secure Connectivity Virtual Private Networks (Herscovitz, 1999), Public Key Infrastructure (Bosworth & Tedeschi, 2001) 
Perimeter Security IP Firewall, Site Management Tools 
Security Monitoring Intrusion Detection, Virus Scanning 
Identity AAA Principle (Authentication, Authorization, Accountability) 
Security Management Policy, Trust 
Content Security Role-based or Task-based Access Control (Oh and Park, 2003), Semantic Firewall (Callahan, 2002) 
 
 
Without a dedicated IT security team, it will be almost impossible for a SME to grasp the whole picture of 
security, let alone making strategic planning on protecting its information assets. The return on investments in security 
protection is so volatile but at the same time such investments become inevitable, knowing how to protect its 
information asset effectively and efficiently has emerged as a new battlefield for maintaining the strategic advantages 
of an enterprise. Obviously, if SMEs do not have a good understanding on these issues, they will stand to lose against 
the corporate giants. A significantly smaller return on investments in security protection certainly is not acceptable; it 
threatens the long-term prosperity of the SMEs. To offer effective facilitation, we first identify the causes to their 
weaknesses. We have investigated the practices on information security in two small IT consulting firms. We then 
develop a model that is suitable to help SMEs to make strategic decisions on security protection. While applying the 
model to real situations, we discover that a model itself is not sufficient; we need to define the process on executing 
the model. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. We analyze and identify the common practice in security 
protection at two SMEs in section 2. In section 3, for clarifying our research motivation and focus, we summarize our 
survey of existing facilitation methods for security protection. We then discuss the quality attributes of security 
protection in section 4 and the value attributes of information assets in section 5. With all the factors identified, we 
present our version of a decision-support model in section 6 and an execution process for the model in section 7. 
Afterwards, in two sections that follow, we examine an application and conduct an effectiveness analysis of our 
facilitation framework. Finally, we highlight the significance of this research in section 10.  
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ANALYSIS OF COMMON PRACTICE IN SECURITY PROTECTION OF A TYPICAL SME 
 
We have investigated the practices on information security in two small IT consulting firms (we hereafter 
refer them as Firm A and Firm B). While both firms have similar size in terms of the number of employees, 
approximately, around 30, Firm A is relatively young in terms of business maturity whereas Firm B has been in the 
consulting business for more than two decades. Consequently, Firm A struggles for cash flows while Firm B can 
operate on accrued revenues due to its established credit and account receivables. Since both are in IT consulting 
business, they have made extraordinary efforts on protecting information assets. Surprisingly the efforts at both firms 
on information assets protection remain quite primitive and often without direction. We summarize both positive and 
negative findings of their practices on information security protection as follows. 
 
 Management has been highly decisive but manages the issues largely by hearsay. The management is highly 
supportive for protecting information assets and often makes a commitment right on the spot. We were told 
by their system engineers that the best chance to get management’s support was when some successful hacks 
or security concerns were reported on the news media. There is no separate budget on information security 
but, as needed, the total budget allocated for general system infrastructure could be used to block the security 
holes. 
 Security protection is considered as a strict technical issue. It is interesting to notice that the senior managers 
at both firms do not know much about protecting the data that they access daily. Functional and 
administrative personnel nearly never get involved in discussions of information security. While the firewalls 
and anti-virus programs have been heavily deployed and frequently upgraded, internal access control nearly 
does not exist.  
 Inconsistent decisions on investments in information security heavily rely on a few silver bullets. There is no 
formal security policy established for the firms to communicate with their staff about the security issues. 
Nearly all the security projects are launched in a reactive manner. A change in key security personnel usually 
brings about severe interference to security protection and often triggers a dramatic shift of security software 
and hardware being deployed.  
 
Although these deficiencies are troublesome, they are by no means atypical in SMEs. On the upside, we also 
observed some good qualities that may be naturally inherited to SMEs. If leveraged properly, they could become 
significant advantages over large firms. They are highlighted below. 
 
 The decision cycle is brief. Unlike a large organization, a commitment or an approval to security initiatives 
can be obtained in a timely manner at both firms. Usually such a decision is made by the senior management 
upon their intuitions without significant involvement from the functional managers. However, the decision is 
always responsive and directly addresses the current situation and provides solutions at least for the short run. 
 The information system infrastructure is quite uniform. Both firms are specialized in certain business sectors 
and certain types of applications. For example, Firm A has been focusing on customer-relationship 
applications and Firm B serves the clients in the legal service sector by integrating the data from various 
legacy systems. The specialization allows them to maintain somewhat homogeneous system infrastructure. 
Consequently, the required protection schema is much simpler and can be uniformly applied, which lessens 
the integration issue and improves the efficiency.  
 A strong sense of accountability is shared between the management and security personnel. Both firms hold a 
system architecture team that consists of two to four system engineers who respond to all the computing 
needs for the entire firm. The small team thus possesses a vertically integrated knowledge of the system 
infrastructure and its needs for information security. If a security problem occurs, the designated engineers 
would work dedicatedly around the clock to resolve the problem without going through a bureaucratic 
process of approval and multiple remedy tickets that are usually required in large firms. 
 
Concerned with the fact that a higher percentage of IT budget spent on security protection by small firms and 
the findings from these two firms, we believe SMEs need a simplified and attainable facilitation that can help them 
overcome their weaknesses and at the same time brace their strengths. With such a motivation, we have studied the 
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existing research on facilitating information security protection and have developed an alternative approach to 
facilitation, particularly suitable for SMEs. 
 
EXISTING FACILITATION METHODS FOR SECURITY PROTECTION  
 
Researchers and industrialists have been intensely exploring facilitative approaches to protecting information 
assets. One representative direction is to advance the technologies for access control. Extended from database 
management, role-based access control models characterized by (Sandhu, 1996) have improved the versatility of 
security control. Bertino et al. (1998) presented a temporal access control model and made such a model more 
expressive. While early research results represented a logical programming approach to role-based access control, 
successive research results advanced the status quo with graph transformations as exemplified by Koch et al. (2000). 
Although these two facilitation schemes share the same theoretical foundation and in principle can be converted to 
each other, the graph approach involves the stakeholders in security management much easier.  
 
To further enhance the declarative strength of security deployment in response to the increased complexity of 
enterprise information systems, some researchers investigated the feasibility of incorporating more intelligence into 
access control scheme. Botha et al. (2002) proposed a dynamic model, based on trend analysis, fuzzy logic and neural 
networks. In efforts on maximizing the benefits from security control, some approaches suggested that information 
assets be protected in terms of specific concerns from major stakeholders. Typically, Walton (2002) proposed a multi-
tiered model that consists of network infrastructure, middleware, Web infrastructure, and a set of applications and 
services available to the user community. The resultant architecture would cover policies, business practice changes, 
and user awareness concerns. In the same direction, Bakry (2003) recommended a general procedure for specifying 
security protection in which the effectiveness of security protection relevant to cost and legal rights was considered. 
To assist in centralized control on security deployment, Rees et al. (2003) suggested that policy development be an 
iterative process that should have feedback at every step.  
 
As the cost on security protection continued to soar, other researchers have been in search of valid models to 
figure out optimal investments in security protection. Gordon and Loeb (2002) in their research emphasized that firms 
should pursue an optimal level of information security investments in lieu of the return on such investments because 
the traditional formulas for ROI simply did not apply. Another representative model by Cavusoglu et al. (2004) is to 
evaluate security investments in terms of three purposes, namely prevention, detection, and response, for each of 
which they proposed specific mathematical models based on game theories to estimate the return on IT security 
investments.  
 
DESIRED QUALITY ATTRIBUTES OF SECURITY DECISIONS 
 
 These recent advancements suffer from some critical deficiencies, among which, two are addressed in our 
research. First, these models still too narrowly interpret security protection and largely overlook the effect of security 
measures on the total utility of protected assets of which the stakeholders usually possess different valuations (Seddon 
et al., 1999). Second, their proposed models are increasingly complex and demand in-depth expertise in a variety of 
fields. Such approaches to facilitating information security planning not only exceed the affordability but also highly 
likely clash with the management style of SMEs. Even if SMEs would applaud a holistic approach to security 
protection (Eloff and Eloff, 2003) for the fear of devastating consequences of information security breaches 
(Campbell et al., 2003), the complexity resulting from all the issues involved in security protection (Knapp et al., 
2004) would make such a goal unattainable to them. Any effective facilitation must be simple and practical. Security 
protection profoundly impacts the total utility of its information assets and closely affects the strategic 
competitiveness of an enterprise. As firms stretch their affordability to costly security protection, those invest for a 
sustainable return would be able to gain a competitive edge. In accordance, we believe the return on IT security 
investments should be tied to the corporate competence in protecting its information assets. Such competence should 
be assessed in terms of three key quality attributes: 
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 Is it durable? 
 Is it invincible? 
 Is it intrinsic? 
 
The durable attribute implies that such competence should give a firm a handsome return over a longer 
period of time than what its competitors could reach. The invincible quality attribute requires that such competence 
continue to foster even if key security personnel have changed and key technologies underpinning the protection have 
evolved. The third desired attribute denotes that such competence must be inherent to the firm and hard to be copied 
by others, and thus become the firm’s sustainable competitiveness. 
 
TOTAL UTILITY OF INFORMATION ASSETS  
 
Similar to the concept of utility in economics and finance (Sharpe et al., 1999, pages 142 – 144), we use the 
term total utility as a measure of the aggregated, rather than partial, reward or satisfaction gained from owning and 
protecting the information assets of a company. Three quality attributes, namely, availability, integration, and 
reliability, have been proposed in the past, suggesting that they represent the core value of information assets of a 
business (Strong et al., 1997; Tayi and Ballou, 1998; Parssian et al., 1999). Consequently, we focus on these three 
quality attributes for evaluating the total utility. If necessary, the set of quality attributes can be further extended. 
Equilibrium of these three attribute exists, which means that the value of each quality attribute may vary but the total 
utility of information assets could remain optimal. This is because the valuation of optimality changes over time and 
among different user groups. An analysis of the impact of security protection on the primary quality attributes allows a 
balanced assessment of the short- and long-term returns on investments in security measures. The concept can be 
better illustrated graphically. Figure 2 shows two curves, namely, the attacking curve and the efficiency curve in 
relation to the security protection of information assets of a company. 
 
 
Attack
Efficient
Frontier
Security Protectionx0
Figure 2. The relationship between security protection and
utility of protected assets. *RL: Risk Level.
Utility
RLi
RL*k
RLj
 
 
 
As shown in the figure, the X-axis indicates the degree of security protection on information assets while the 
Y-axis indicates the efficiency of both sides of efforts, namely, the intrusion side and the protection side. Each utility 
curve represents the efficiency that measures the total utility of the three quality attributes (i.e. availability, 
integration, and reliability) at a preferred risk tolerance level that a company is willing to invest to safeguard its 
information assets. The efficiency frontier is formed by connecting the optimal returns of each of the utility curves. 
The Attack curve describes the relationship between successful intrusions and the extent of security protection. 
Traditionally, the decisions on information security are made solely based on such a relationship. The effect of 
security protection on other business attributes is often overlooked. For example, while keeping other factors 
unchanged, the relationship between the access control and the resultant utility of protected information should be 
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measured to find out what the optimal extent of security protection is. As the intrusions increase, security protection 
has to be further tightened. The possible benefit may be the better reliability of information. However, as security 
control becomes excessive, the utility of information asset will likely shift in a reverse direction for a couple of 
reasons. First, the availability suffers as more strict access control is deployed. Second, the integrity of information 
deteriorates as information exchanges from various data sources become complicated and impassive. To a certain 
point, the disadvantages will overwhelm the perceived advantages. Therefore, the goal of our facilitation framework 
for sound strategic decisions should enhance all these three quality attributes in accordance with the feasible 
efficiency zone defined for a firm in support of its ultimate business goals. 
 
Akin to many investments, we believe ultimately we should only pursue a sound and practical, rather than an 
optimal, decision on information security protection. This should be especially instrumental to SMEs where cost 
effectiveness is essential for survival and growth. Because of numerous interrelated factors affecting the return on 
investments in information security, it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether an individual decision on security 
protection is optimal. While pursuing an optimal result sounds attractive, there is no way to justify the ultimate return 
on such efforts and even worse, oftentimes, there is no way to verify upfront that such an optimal result does exist. 
Furthermore, when the business environment and conditions change, a previously made optimal decision could 
become obsolete. Therefore, any facilitation should heuristically guide the decision maker to stick to the principles as 
fundamental as possible. 
 
NEEDS FOR STRATEGIC THINKING OF SECURITY PROTECTION 
 
On the one hand, we have suggested a firm should cultivate the competence in information security 
protection and, on the other hand, we have proposed that a firm should exercise its competency in accordance with the 
desired total utility of its information assets. Clearly, what we need is a framework for facilitating strategic decisions 
that accomplish both. In reality, due to the intimate correlation between information security protection and other 
business performance attributes, any facilitation should promote inclusion of security protection into the corporate 
business strategic plan. We also believe that the return on security investments should be assessed over both the short- 
and the long- term results. To achieve that, our facilitation should help a decision maker gain an integrated assessment 
of the security issue in conjunction with other business issues. Nevertheless, as we pursue integrated thinking of 
security issues, the complexity unavoidably increases. Hence, decisions must be drawn upon an intuitive and 
analytical model in which concerns are represented in multi-layer resolutions so that decision makers can address 
them in a declarative and yet consistent manner. Constrained by such a decision-support model, for example, a 
security measure that least contradicts the concerns at a higher layer could be identified as the most desirable unless 
exceptional reasons uphold against such a decision. 
 
Security decisions affect business prosperity. Reversely, business decisions also influence information 
security. Enterprise information assets are exposed to a variety of risks that in general can be classified into two main 
categories, namely, natural disasters, due to natural causes, and artificial disasters, due to negligent or malicious 
behaviors, which vary partially in accordance with business models. It is true that the ultimate threats of either type of 
hazard could result in the irrecoverable damage to the competitiveness of a firm, but the patterns of these two types of 
threat could significantly differ. Although the traditional statistical analysis may work acceptably well in predicting 
the risk of natural disasters, the occurrence of artificial disasters is quite unpredictable and varies from time to time 
and from hacker to hacker. As the frequency of such attacks is difficult to fit any patterns, the intensity of them could 
be gravely severe. The corporate competence in protecting its information assets could sharply reduce the likelihood 
of artificial disasters whereas it has little effect on natural disasters. Additionally, security leaks due to internal 
employees’ unintentional mishandling can be classified as either kind of disaster since, on the one hand, human errors 
are inevitable but, on the other hand, the frequency of occurrence can be much reduced through effective prevention 
such as trainings. Ultimately, nearly every business decision would impact the security risk of information assets. At 
the highest level, the evolution of a business model may significantly change the risk factor of security protection. As 
shown in Table 2, a centralized information infrastructure may be able to better control and respond to artificial 
disasters while it exposes more to natural disasters. 
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Table 2:  Security Risks Are Associated With Business Models 
 
Risk versus Model Centralized model Decentralized model 
Natural Disasters High Low 
Artificial Disasters Low High 
 
 
As another example to show the consequential effect of a business decision on security risk, a decision to 
mobilize the workforce is to deploy more wireless and portable computing devices. As a result, the enterprise 
information assets could be exposes to much more risks than ever. From these examples, we can see most measures 
applied to improve some quality attributes of a business, which likely incur an expense of information security. 
Therefore, the goal of any facilitation should encourage an intimate involvement from all levels of stakeholders.  
 
OVERVIEW OF A DECISION MAKING MODEL FOR SMES 
 
Preceding discussions identify the specific challenges and complexity of security issues that SMEs face. Our 
research has concluded that any effective facilitation for SMEs to think strategically about information security should 
take into account other business issues. At the same time it needs to be intuitive and attainable. It must also have 
provision to include total and systematic involvement of all stakeholders. With these principles in mind, our 
facilitation is to focus on the pragmatics, rather than optimality, of a security decision. As depicted in Figure 3, the 
model consists of three key components that must function cooperatively to deal with interrelated factors involved in 
security protection.  
 
 
Figure 3.  The architecture of a strategic decision model 
for protecting information assets.
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The first component of the decision-support model, shown in the middle of the figure, is a layered constraint-
based representation model that readily supports knowledge generalization and aggregation. Even though information 
assets are physically distributed, however, they are logically integrated. A supportive and well-defined representing 
schema could mitigate the weakness that security measures are usually applied to information entities without 
considering other more general levels of security protection. With a coherent but decomposable knowledge 
representation framework, multi-dimension concerns can be visualized since each security measure no longer 
functions in an isolated manner. Business requirements organized in terms of layers could affect low-level technical 
decisions in a justifiable fashion. Consequently, an inclusive comprehension of a complex security issue can be better 
supported at a chosen level of resolution. Due to specialization and distribution of responsibilities, decision makers 
need to understand an issue at an abstract layer of their level to avoid drilling down for excessive details. 
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Internal to the layered representation hierarchy, as the second component of the decision-support model, on 
the left in Figure 2, is a set of relevant default constraints that are grouped in terms of industrial security options. The 
ability to systematically identify security needs with minimal conflicts to the protection on other information entities 
profoundly correlates to the total utility of protected information assets. Therefore, our model supports that individual 
security protections must be measured in relevance to industrial practice in security protection so that the unique risk 
undertaken can be controlled and the total cost on security protection can be contained. In addition, custom constraints 
are organized in such a way that individualized security needs can be accommodated to the extent consistent to their 
parent constraints of the representation model. With our model, a security initiative that has minimal negative impact 
to the concerns of a parent layer would be first accepted unless exceptional reasons are against it.  
 
Dynamic syntheses and subscription to granulated information entities is the third component of our model, 
on the right in Figure 2. They ensure a strong integration of security control but allow a higher degree of flexibility. 
As the business environment keeps changing, so does the protection on information assets. Such changes must be 
adapted in a reckonable manner, especially when measures are impacted. We propose that, on the one hand, all 
security measures be applied as a set of complementary measures and that, on the other hand, a clear subscription 
policy be specified such that exceptional needs can be accommodated. The third component of our decision-support 
model should help balance across multiple attributes of the valuation of information assets. For example, the response 
time to behavioral changes of a managed system could be a noteworthy indication of the effectiveness of security 
control. At the same time, the increased traffic monitoring should only be adjusted in accordance with the possibility 
of attack and severity of attack. Dynamic synthesis and subscription would offer an adaptable mechanism for users to 
deal with security risks. For example, while neither delayed response time nor slow detection on attacks is desirable, 
they should all be assessed in conjunction with other concerns that may be more overwhelming in scope and duration. 
 
The model highlighted above would not happen without a full participation from all stakeholders. When we 
initially introduced our model to Firm A and Firm B, the general response was that it sounded reasonable but the 
stakeholders were uncertain how the goals could be achieved. We then ascertained the missing link in most of the 
previous research was the process of facilitation. Subsequently, we defined a process with both firms and customized 
the process to gain support from all decision makers at various levels. In the following sections, we describe the 
process in general and then illustrate how it works. 
 
THE PROCESS FOR CONSTRUCTING THE DECISION SUPPORT MODEL 
 
 As identified above, the decision framework that promotes strategic thinking has to be accompanied with a 
process. The process will take into considerations not only technical but also functional and managerial requirements. 
The followings summarize the main steps of the process: 
 
 Identify business applications, and classify them in terms of ownership, e.g. owned by corporate, by 
department, by group, or by individual. 
 Compose an individual utility table (or utility tree, as shown in Kazman et al., 2001, if subsets of utility 
attributes need to be identified) for calculating the total utility of each application by conducting mainly 
the following two steps: 
 
o Identify all the user representatives at the corresponding level and collect the quality attributes 
from them. 
o Consolidate the required quality attributes by consulting with the user representatives and 
quantify the benefit of each quality attribute in relation to others. 
o Identify all the information assets accessed by the application and associate the set of quality 
attributes to these assets. 
 
 Consolidate individual utility tables for the applications that share the same information assets either 
partially or fully through the following steps: 
 
o Collect the quality attributes and corresponding weights for all the group applications. 
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o Select a common set of quality attributes and search for the efficient zone where the total 
utility reaches the maximal value as perceived by all concerned stakeholders. 
o Classify all the applications in respect to their needs for security protection and then repeat the 
same step until the discrepancies of their security needs within each resultant set of 
applications are insignificant. 
 
 Identify and characterize the protection options available at the corresponding layer such that the 
chosen set of security measures yields the minimal redundancies over the measures at the previous 
layers and the maximal consistency with the measures on the sibling information assets. 
 Identify and characterize the security options that would best support the delivery of the required utility 
as a group. 
 Establish the security protection standard for each level of ownership in descending order by 
conducting the following two steps: 
 
o Identify the common security measures shared by the applications owned by the organizational 
units at the same level. 
o Remove the measures that have already been covered by the upper-layer security protection 
standard. 
 
The outcome of this process would be a multiple-layer model that defines the security protection needs and 
security measures with minimal inconsistency. Each business unit is asked to define a subscription policy in a similar 
top-down manner to ensure the consistency and flexibility. For those without an explicit subscription policy, a default 
set of security protection will prevail. 
 
By following these steps, a model for facilitating strategic decision making is generated to capture the unique 
security needs of an enterprise. The model for strategic thinking of security protection should remain valid for as long 
as the business model does not change. Because the mission and goals of an enterprise do not change radically, 
business models are relatively stable in most cases, including both Firm A and Firm B in our study. Therefore, the 
utility tables constructed for each level of the organizational units are also stable. All of these support the 
practicability of our decision-support model. 
 
FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED DECISION-SUPPORT MODEL AND PROCESS 
 
 We have presented the strategic decision model and accompanying process to the two firms for their 
endorsement. The feedback was quite encouraging. The leadership of both companies was interested in complying 
with the model to change their traditional decision making approaches. In this section, we describe the customized 
process that has been adopted by these two firms. Note that the process closely follows the steps specified in our 
framework as discussed in the previous section. 
 
 At the corporate level, we asked the top management to identify the importance of each business function in 
support of the corporate mission. Such identifications provided us with the ultimate utility of corporate information 
assets. Interestingly, as shown in Table 3, the top management of these two companies perceived the ideal utility quite 
differently, in part because they are in different stages of business maturity. In accordance, we recommended a set of 
corporate-level security measures to each company, such as control on email services and virtual private networks.  
 
 
Table 3:  The Total Utility Of Corporate Information Asset Perceived 
By Senior Leaders At Two Companies In Different Stages Of Business Maturity 
 
Stakeholder/Composite 
Weight 
Integrity Availability Reliability 
Company A 20 40 40 
Company B 30 30 40 
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 The differences between two sets of measures are subtle but distinctive. Particularly, access control and 
traffic monitoring vary significantly between these two companies because each firm has different response time 
requirements. We later requested the same kind of input for the same set of utility attributes from the accounting and 
marketing departments. The marketing department in Firm A does not have specific opinions on that while the 
accounting department weighed data integrity higher than two other attributes. We then asked the top management to 
assign an influence coefficient to each of these two departments in terms of corporate goals. An influence coefficient 
is as an indicator of importance of quality attribute relative to each other. After identifying the corporate-level security 
needs, the process moves down to the department level to define the department-level needs. Table 4 shows the 
resultant utility at the department level of Firm A. The utility expectation indicates somewhat inconsistent valuations 
of the total utility of information asset between the two departments. For example, the accounting department requires 
more on integrity while the marketing department prefers higher availability. As a result, security measures are 
proposed differently to ensure the delivery of each specific utility of information assets. For instance, more encryption 
software were acquired to support data exchange among various accounting applications while a parallel server was 
installed for the marketing department to guarantee a nearly 100% availability of its website. Similar analysis was 
conducted at Firm B and the results are quite different from Firm A’s. Overall, the utility perceived at the department 
level is reasonably consistent with its corporate-level total utility. After minor adjustments to the standard set of 
security measures both departments at Firm B were satisfied. At the next level, we focused on the total utility of 
information assets perceived by each application group. In that phase, application stakeholders could voice their 
concerns and requirements. Although most applications did not demand anything conflicting to the valuations 
perceived at higher levels in each firm, one application in Firm B was developed to target a new market segment 
which required significantly more bandwidth if it had to comply with the same security measures. The top 
management supported the upgrade of the network infrastructure instead of relaxing the security measures. 
 
 
Table 4:  The Total Utility Of Information Asset Perceived By Main Business Units At Firm A 
 
Stakeholder / 
Composite Weight 
Influence Coefficient Integrity Availability Reliability 
Accounting 0.4 30 35 35 
Marketing 0.6 20 40 40 
Composite Weight 1 24 (= 30*0.4 + 20*0.6) 38 (same formula) 38 (= 35*0.4 + 40*0.6) 
 
 
 The same processes were carried out to establish similar security protection for all group applications. 
Everyone was surprised to notice that these group applications largely fed data to department applications and thus 
could easily comply with the level of security protection specified for the department applications. 
 
 Finally, to find out an acceptable level of security protection, we adjusted the weight of the total utility that 
comprised of the significant quality attributes in an opposite direction to the level of security protection. This exercise 
shows that each firm, as a whole, has to balance between the total utility of its information assets and the level of 
security risk it bears. Similar adjustments can be conducted for individual business units so that security protection 
can be synthesized at various levels of granularity. Note that we were aware that the relationship between the total 
utility and security protection could be derived from statistical data collected within the same industry. If a firm has a 
unique valuation of its information assets or exceptional security needs, then explicit computational analysis should be 
applied to gauge the corresponding ROI in security protection.  Referring to the graph in Figure 2, we denote the 
degree of security protection as x. In accordance, the loss or gain of the total utility due to security protection can be a 
function of security protection in terms of each quality attribute. Specifically, the lost availability, which includes 
throughput and response time, is defined as a(x); the lost reliability, which can be attributed to error rates and data 
quality, as r(x), and the lost integrity, which usually refers the value of integrated information, as i(x). These 
functions could be derived primarily from performance benchmarks furnished by vendors. We then have the weighted 
total utility loss, due to the security measures, defined as utility(x) = wa*a(x) + wr*r(x) + wi*i(x), where wa, wr, and 
wi are the weights for availability, reliability, and integration that are determined by the stakeholders as discussed 
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above. By adjusting the degree of security control, we could improve the utility, of course, at the expense of increased 
security risk. Our objective is to find out xoptimal such that when x = xoptimal, we would have the optimal amount of total 
utility equal to 1 - utility(x). Consider, for instance, the impact of adding firewall protection on the total utility of 
information assets. From statistical data of vendors or from the industry, on the average a firewall reduced the 
throughput and the authentication schema built in the firewall may further measurably slow down the response time. 
By letting a(firewall) be +0.4, r(firewall) be -0.2, and i(firewall) be +0.2, we mean that adding firewall protection 
as a security measure, the company will lose 40% of utility on the availability and 20% on integrity, but it will gain 
20% of its reliability. These numbers reflect the relative gains or losses that are unique and specific to the company in 
concern. Besides, some of them are objective while others are subjective. In this example, the loss of availability due 
to firewall protection is measurable and thus objective, but the degradation of information integration due to the 
firewall protection could not be readily assessable and therefore somewhat subjective. Although the estimates of this 
kind are only approximate, they should converge over time, especially when multiple kinds of firewall, such as 
semantic firewalls, are in operation and can serve as a comparison. Once the impact of security protection on the total 
utility of information assets is assessed, the resultant numbers, along with the composite weights such as those listed 
in Table 4, are applied to the equation to yield the total loss due to the firewall protection; that is, utility(firewall) = .24 
* .4 - .38 * .2 + .38 * .2 = 0.096. It means that the firewall protection results in a loss of total utility of their 
information assets, amounted to 9.6% of the prior total utility. The normalized residual utility then is 1 – 0.096 = 
0.904. Obviously, deploying firewall protection without compensating its side effect does not make a business sense. 
Based on such an analysis, additional computing power and bandwidth should be considered as a part of the security 
protection. The additional cost can be evaluated and justified whether the protection plan is viable or not. We admit 
that these figures are not based on a rigorous mathematical model. However, the process that generates these figures 
renders the needed discipline to enforce an affordable, meaningful, and qualitative way for SMEs to think 
systematically about security protection. Finally, as a part of our facilitation framework, each firm should set up a 
security subscription policy that mirrors the layered model of security protection. Through the layered model, each 
business application must follow a procedure to determine if it needs exceptional subscription, either to intensify or to 
relax the security protection in question. 
 
EVALUATION OF THE OVERALL APPROACH 
 
Through the process above, we established a decision-support model on deploying security measures. None of 
senior managers had realized their achievement until we presented the documented security plan resulting from the 
process they had gone through. As characterized previously in Figure 3, the resultant decision-support model was an 
integration of three components, namely, a constraint-based security protection model, customized constraint objects, 
and synthesis and subscription. To convince our industrial clients, we analyzed the quality attributes of the decision-
support model and identified the following characteristics of the model: 
 
 Simplicity: The model offers layered resolutions of security issues to isolate the complexity of interrelated 
business requirements. Considering security measures in terms of various resolutions could help a decision 
maker focus on the issues with a clearly defined scope and depth. Therefore, the resultant abstract 
representation of the protected information assets establishes a foundation to provide a systematic defense. 
The protection could remain at the highest resolution layer without losing full coverage of protection since 
each identifiable information asset, with exceptional security concerns or without, could be tied to default 
protection. For example, even though many groups are not aware of certain security risks, their information 
assets are protected to the extent defined at their parent level. As another example, some employees are never 
concerned or aware about security risks of their desktops, but they are protected because the security 
measures of both their PCs and the applications installed on their desktops are enforced at the level set by 
their departments.  
 Consistency: The model also establishes a hierarchical inheritance for consistent security enforcement that 
supports heuristic enforcement. In addition to clarifying the organizational accountability to protecting 
information assets, the model can help visualize any inconsistency of security protection needs at different 
levels. For example, to encourage the system administrator to consider the corporate security policy, we 
should recommend that, by default, such a policy render the minimal protection. Unless certain business 
functions need special protection, its policy should inherit the security policy defined for the functional group 
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at a higher layer. By organizing the security protection in terms of organizational units, our model supports 
aggregation. By classifying the needs for security protection within an aggregation, our model leverages 
generalization. Generalized protection is not equivalent to aggregated protection. The former maintains 
internal consistency whereas the latter represents external consistency.  
 Measured Risk: The model is capable of incorporating exceptional security requirements with standard 
security policy. As a prudent measure, our decision- support facilitation framework allows flexibility for 
exceptional protection via the synthesis and subscription component. Such exceptional security measures can 
be integrated into the model and additional efforts on protection can be measured in comparison to the 
standard protection. Consequently, the unique risk taken by a firm is calculated. 
 Total Accountability: Our framework enforces the involvement from appropriate functional groups at 
appropriate times. Each role plays in a restrictive manner (because of designated layers) and allows 
incorporation of specific security protection from others and even from subordinates. Following such a 
structured approach, senior managers and security architects especially endued less stress. Line managers 
sense more ownership of the information assets and subsequently balance the needs and measures more 
carefully. Consequently, security risk management becomes every group’s responsibility.  
 
The whole process of constructing such a decision model usually does not require much computational 
analysis for preserving its validity because the resultant model develops from one layer to another in an intuitive, 
iterative and incremental manner. However, if a firm dramatically differs from a typical business model in its industry 
or is at an unusual stage of its corporate life cycle, it may have a unique valuation of total utility of its information 
assets. In such a situation, we recommend mixing a more rigorous formal model with our framework. For example, an 
explicit risk assessment should be conducted using, say, Markowitz factor models [Kritzman 93] for assessing unique 
risks. However, instead of applying such a model to determining the total utility of information assets for the entire 
corporation, the model should be applied only to the layer of the organizational units of concern and the resultant 
analysis should also be relatively easy due to much reduced complexity and can be conducted in comparison to the 
typical cases from the same industry.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As the cost on protecting corporate information assets soars, SMEs are facing more challenges than large 
firms do. To help them cope with their disadvantageous situations, we have investigated a facilitation framework that 
inherently promotes strategic thinking of security protection issues and results in a decision-support model that 
systematically enhance the total utility of corporate information assets with minimal conflicts among organizational 
units. The process of developing such a strategic decision model in general does not require explicit computational 
analysis while it can still ensure its logical soundness and practicality. Our approach has been built upon the real case 
analyses and then has been applied to the same cases to gauge its validity. Therefore, our approach has both 
theoretical and practical significance and will provide a meaningful solution, particularly feasible for SMEs.  
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